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Abstract 
 
In this qualitative study, the authors apply Callon’s sociology of translation to examine how new 
technology entrepreneurs enact material arguments that involve the first two moments of 
translation—problematization (defining a market problem) and interessement (defining a market 
and the firm’s relationship to it) - which in turn are represented in a claim, the value proposition. 
That emergent claim can then be represented and further changed during pitches. If accepted, it 
can then lead to the second two moments of translation: enrollment and mobilization. Drawing 
on written materials, observations, and interviews, we trace how these value propositions were 
iterated along three paths to better problematize and interesse, articulating a problem and market 
on which a business could plausibly be built. We conclude by discussing implications for 
understanding value propositions in entrepreneurship and, more broadly, using the sociology of 
translation to analyze emergent, material, consequential arguments. 
 
The study is based on data collected at the Austin Technology Incubator’s Student Entrepreneur 
Acceleration and Launch program (ATI SEAL) at The University of Texas at Austin. 
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Articulating problems and markets: A 
translation analysis of entrepreneurs’ 
emergent value propositions 
Abstract 
In this qualitative study, the authors apply Callon’s sociology of translation to examine how new 
technology entrepreneurs enact material arguments that involve the first two moments of 
translation—problematization (defining a market problem) and interessement (defining a market 
and the firm’s relationship to it)—which in turn are represented in a claim, the value proposition. 
That emergent claim can then be represented and further changed during pitches. If accepted, it 
can then lead to the second two moments of translation: enrollment and mobilization. 
Drawing on written materials, observations, and interviews, we trace how these value 
propositions were iterated along three paths to better problematize and interesse, articulating a 
problem and market on which a business could plausibly be built. We conclude by discussing 
implications for understanding value propositions in entrepreneurship and, more broadly, using 
the sociology of translation to analyze emergent, material, consequential arguments.  
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Introduction 
In early summer 2017, the founder of a new firm (we’ll call it W1) stepped on stage to present 
his 12-minute business pitch. This pitch would be the beginning of his firm’s participation in the 
Student Entrepreneurship Acceleration and Launch (SEAL) program, a 10-week summer 
program meant to mentor student-led firms as they explored the possibility of launching their 
technology-centered businesses. Today was SEAL’s kickoff event: each of the 17 firms had to 
pitch their businesses to each other and to a room full of experienced mentors. After each pitch, 
the mentors were surveyed and the results aggregated for the firms to review later. 
W1’s pitch was straightforward. Invasive species—specifically zebra mussels and quagga 
mussels—had begun appearing in Texas lakes. Once established in a lake, these mollusks would 
crowd out other aquatic wildlife. Worse, they could also ruin the water purification equipment 
that allowed local towns to use these lakes as water supplies. But current methods of detecting 
these mollusks were unreliable, and current methods of eradicating them were both expensive 
and damaging to the environment. W1 offered a new, far less expensive and more reliable way to 
provide early detection. At a later stage, W1 also planned to develop a less expensive and less 
ecologically damaging way to eradicate the invasive species.  
Yet mentors rated W1’s investment potential as relatively low: a 3.5 out of 5. In their comments, 
they said that W1 was “Addressing important problem” with a “clear need, application,” but W1 
needed to provide “more on pich [sic], biz details”; they asked, “What is it going to take to get 
this done?” Of the 11 surveyed mentors, 7 agreed that W1 needed to work on market validation 
or market segment/size. In other words, they agreed that although W1 had identified a problem, 
it had not identified a market: specific actors (such as lake authorities or state agencies) who 
would spend money to solve it. And money is important: for a problem to be solved by a 
business (as opposed to another configuration such as a public agency), that business must 
sustain itself via a reliable revenue stream.  
Like W1, other firms had trouble convincingly articulating their problem, market, or both. For 
instance, I1 proposed a software layer that would integrate Amazon Echo units into international 
hotels, automating concierge requests in a variety of languages; mentors generally agreed that the 
problem was underdefined and the market was untested. T1 proposed a practical levitation 
technology, comparing it to the famous hoverboard from Back to the Future II; one mentor wrote 
that “this is a tech[nology] right now” and another wrote that T1 had to “figure out the 
application + market potential.” That is, these two innovators had produced a technology, but 
had not connected it with a business solution or a market solution. Without identifying a problem 
and market, these firms could not formulate the value proposition: the central claim that 
identifies how a firm can bring specific value to specific stakeholders, a claim that goes on to 
materially impact every aspect of the firm, from advertising and marketing to organization to 
R&D efforts to hiring strategy.  
The processes of developing the problem and market—or, as they are commonly called in 
studies anchored in actor-network theory, problematization and interessement (Callon 1986; 
Swarts 2016)—are critical processes for a firm attempting to build a sustainable business. 
Problematization involves establishing whether a problem exists and whether it is painful enough 
to shift or disrupt an assemblage of material relations. Interessement involves establishing, out of 
a universe of potential actors, which ones are relevant to the problem; defining and 
characterizing them; extracting their agreement that the problem is pressing; and providing an 
 3 
acceptable path to addressing the problem, a path that runs through the obligatory passage point 
(Callon 1986, p.196) of the firm. Problematization and interessement are reciprocal processes, 
leading to the formulation of the value proposition: a succinct claim that provides a stabilized 
representation of the results of problematization and interessement, i.e., the problem-market 
relationship. The value proposition then becomes the heart of a pitch, in which the actors can be 
enrolled, and post-pitch activities, in which they are mobilized. Together, these four moments—
problematization, interessement, enrollment, and mobilization—comprise translation, in which 
an alliance, “a constraining network of relationships,” develops as a sustainable compromise 
among the interests of the different actors (Callon 1986, p.79). 
In this qualitative case study, we specifically focus on the first two moments of translation—
problematization and interessement—and examine how they result in a transformed value 
proposition that is ideally stable enough to support a venture. How would W1 and others attempt 
to problematize the world so that their technologies could be positioned as solutions, then 
interesse (i.e., create interessement with) market actors who needed those solutions, and would 
these changes result in transforming their value propositions?  
Background 
Before turning to the study, we overview relevant literature on translation and on value 
propositions. 
Translation 
In its attempts to develop a problem and define stakeholders, W1 might remind us of another 
case involving mollusks: the famous case of St. Brieuc Bay that Michel Callon (1986) describes. 
In that case, marine researchers, fishermen, and scallops formed an uneasy, mutually beneficial, 
materially instantiated alliance. The researchers wanted to study scallops to determine how to 
best preserve them in the long term; the fishermen wanted to ensure their long-term livelihood; 
and the scallops presumably wanted to live undisturbed. The researchers coordinated an alliance 
in which they deployed larvae collectors into which the scallops could settle to be studied in 
safety, while the fishermen fished elsewhere. That alliance held until Christmas Eve when it 
suddenly collapsed: Scallops fetched high prices on Christmas Eve as people demanded them for 
the Reveillon feast, so the fishermen decided to follow their short-term, individual interests and 
betray the alliance by raiding the larvae collectors.  
Translation is a materialist frame that others in writing studies have used for understanding 
emergent arguments in complex cross-specialty domains such as disaster communication (Potts 
2009), distributed communication supported by digital technologies (McNely 2009; Swarts 2010, 
2011, 2016), an interdisciplinary university research lab (Read & Swarts 2015), and search 
engine marketing (Spinuzzi 2010). It is often used to discuss how actors persuade each other, 
forming an alliance (a durable network of relations) on which further agreement and actions can 
be built. It has also been used more broadly in studies of science and technology (Latour 1996, 
2006), including entrepreneurship (Akrich, Callon, & Latour 2002a, b). Here, we use it to 
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examine how early-stage entrepreneurs like W1 attempt to formulate emergent, material, 
consequential arguments about problems and markets, represented in value propositions. 
Although a successful venture will eventually use all four moments of translation, SEAL focuses 
primarily on the first two. That is, problematization and interessement must be done to produce a 
value proposition that can be successfully used in a pitch—a pitch that, if successful, enrolls 
stakeholders and leads to mobilization. See Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Moments of translation and their relationships to entrepreneur activities.  
Moment of translation (quotes from 
Swarts 2011, p.278) 
Relation to entrepreneur activities 
Problematization: “reshaping and stating a 
problem or activity in terms specific to a 
particular discourse.” Here, the innovator 
articulates a problem for a market. 
Pre-pitch activities: technology development; 
customer discovery and validation; business 
model development. 
Interessement: “relating an actor’s 
interests with another set of interests.” 
Here, the innovator articulates a market 
that faces a problem. 
Pre-pitch activities: technology development; 
customer discovery and validation; business 
model development. 
(The value proposition represents a stable 
problem-market or problematization-
interessement relationship, presenting a 
solution and its benefits) 
Pitches and pitch decks 
Enrollment: “coordination of actors with 
related interests.” Here, the innovator 
proposes an alliance. 
Post-pitch question-and-answer session (Q&A) 
and sales activities. “To describe enrollment is 
thus to describe the group of multilateral 
negotiations, trials of strength, and tricks that 
accompany the interessements and enable 
them to succeed.” (Callon 1986, p.74) 
Mobilization: “consolidation of interests of 
the group through the representation of a 
spokesperson.” Here, the alliance is 
realized through contracts, agreements, 
and sales. 
Post-pitch agreements. 
 
Value propositions 
The term “value proposition” is fairly recent, having been coined in the 1980s (Lanning & 
Michaels 1988). By 1991, Geoffrey Moore provided a formulaic two-sentence template for value 
propositions (or “positioning statements”), identifying target customers, a specific problem they 
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face, the new product category being offered, a key benefit that solves the problem, and 
advantages over competitors (1991).  
More recently, value propositions have been understood not just as proposing exchange value but 
also as inviting dialogue about use value (Kowalkowski 2011); in such dialogues, they are seen 
as “reciprocal promises of value, operating to and from suppliers and customers seeking an 
equitable exchange” (Ballantyne and Varey 2006, pp. 334-335; cf. Ballantyne et al. 2011). Early 
in the process of formulating a value proposition, the focus is on developing “a shared 
interpretation [between provider and customer], from which the essence of a reciprocal value 
proposition can emerge” (Kowalkowski 2011, p.286). Lusch & Webster (2011) similarly define 
a value proposition as “an invitation [to potential buyers and resource-provider partners] to 
participate in the process of cocreating value that is superior to competitor offerings” (p.132). 
Yet, as Skalen et al. (2014) point out, “the value proposition concept ... remains poorly defined” 
(p.137). Kowalkowski et al. (2012) similarly argue that “there is a growing need for studies that 
address the activities through which value propositions are formed, and how the idiosyncratic 
goals, experiential knowledge, and context of resource-integrating actors influence this 
formation” (p.1555).  
Marketing scholars such as Skalen et al. (2014) and Kowalkowski et al. (2012) have turned to 
practice theory to articulate the value proposition as a reciprocal achievement among actors. But 
we turn instead to the sociology of translation. For our purposes—understanding emergent, 
material, consequential arguments—the sociology of translation has advantages over practice 
theory. First, it allows us to analyze value propositions as arguments that audiences evaluate, 
resist, co-iterate, and can be convinced by. Second, it emphasizes material interactions and 
resistance, whereas practice theory tends to describe intangibles such as knowledge, needs, rules, 
principles, and norms. Third, it has been used and developed in rhetoric and writing studies, 
providing better integration with the concerns of this field, both in the rhetoric of 
entrepreneurship (e.g., Belinsky & Gogan 2016; Galbraith et al. 2014; Lucas et al. 2016) and in 
the field as a whole. 
As illustrated in the previous section, within the sociology of translation, value propositions can 
be understood as attempts to stabilize the results of problematization and interessement (i.e., 
problem and market) in order to solidify a new alliance around which stakeholders can be 
enrolled and mobilized. These value propositions are emergent, material, consequential 
arguments. 
For instance, W1’s value proposition is emergent: out of the many possibilities, W1 is attempting 
to identify both an agreed-upon problem and the specific stakeholders that can be interested in 
allying with W1 to solve it. This emergence is ontological, since market segments are not 
existing categories, but rather attempts to define new categories of stakeholders in relation to a 
problem that is itself emergent and interdefined. The argument is material: it can be resisted not 
just by the customers but also by nonhuman actors such as the invasive species (i.e., W1’s 
technology has to detect and eradicate them to be convincing). And the argument has material 
consequences, not just for sales but also for the nascent firm’s research and development efforts, 
business model, marketing strategy, and hiring strategy. That is, the value proposition is not an 
advertising, marketing, or branding gambit meant to describe an existing product. Nor is it an 
abstract statement with weak connections to concrete decisions, as vision and mission statements 
sometimes are. Rather, the value proposition, once accepted, becomes inscribed in contracts, 
organization, business model, research and development (R&D), and a number of other ways; it 
provides the underlying agreement on which the venture is founded. If the assemblage resists—
 6 
for instance, if W1’s technology were to fail to reliably detect zebra mussels—the value 
proposition must be reformulated or abandoned.  
Value propositions are in flux as a firm attempts problematization and interessement—especially 
in early-stage technology commercialization, in which the technology is fluid and markets have 
not yet been well defined. That is, they must be iterated. In our previous work, we have found 
that entrepreneurs iterate value propositions along at least four dimensions: argument, 
application, design, and financial model (London, Pogue, & Spinuzzi 2015; Pogue, Bravo & 
Tran 2016; Spinuzzi, Jakobs, & Pogue 2016; Spinuzzi et al. 2015). Here, we call this model the 
AADF model (Table 2). Each of these transformations is rhetorical in the sense that they change 
the speculative claim of a value proposition, representing different potential problems and 
potential stakeholders to whom a problem might be compelling. Through these rhetorical moves, 
entrepreneurs attempt to identify plausible product-market configurations that could be stable 
enough to serve as a value proposition. 
 
Table 2. The AADF model, characterizing four rhetorical transformations of value propositions.  
Dimension Question Definition Example 
Argument  Why does this 
innovation bring 
value? 
Changes resulting in a 
more persuasive 
argument for the 
defined stakeholders 
about the defined 
problem and the 
innovation’s ability to 
address it. 
A coated brake spring’s initial 
value proposition is noise 
reduction; the final value 
proposition is greater safety 
through corrosion resistance. 
(London, Pogue, & Spinuzzi 
2015) 
Application  To What should 
this innovation 
be applied in 
order to bring 
value? 
Changes to the 
application that the 
technology can solve, 
such as a new 
problem or target 
market. 
Software for reducing ambient 
noise: originally applied to 
mobile phones, later applied to 
drive-through PA system. 
(London, Pogue, & Spinuzzi 
2015) 
Design  How should this 
innovation be 
changed in order 
to bring value? 
Changes to the 
technology’s design 
to strengthen its 
claim to address a 
problem for a set of 
stakeholders. 
A platform initially delivers 
virtual medical case 
presentations via interactive 
training and student assessment; 
it is redesigned to engage 
students in medical problem-
solving through gamification 
and case studies relevant to a 
partner organization. (Pogue, 
Bravo & Tran 2016) 
Financial 
model  
To Whom can 
this innovation 
Changes to the 
stakeholders 
Initial value proposition offered 
hospital patients reminders and 
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bring value? benefited by the 
claim, usually by 
creating a new 
financial flow or 
finding alternate 
funding sources. 
tracking of medical adherence 
to increase personal health; 
final value proposition offered 
hospitals a tool to reduce up to 
60% of re-admissions during 
the first 30-days post discharge. 
(Pogue, Bravo & Tran 2016) 
 
In this study, we applied the AADF model to identify how participants iterated their value 
propositions in their problematization and interessement attempts. 
Methodology  
We posed the research question: How would entrepreneurs attempt to problematize the world so 
that their technologies could be positioned as solutions, then interesse market actors who needed 
those solutions, and would these changes result in transforming their value propositions? To 
answer this question, we designed an exploratory, qualitative case study, using conventional 
qualitative methods for collecting and analyzing data (Miles, Huberman & Saldana 2014; Propen 
& Schuster 2010; Saldana 2013) that have been used in other studies of writing based in actor-
network theory (e.g., Spinuzzi 2010; Swarts 2016; Teston 2017). Below, we discuss the 
entrepreneurship training program and how we selected participants, as well as our data 
collection, reduction, and analysis procedures. 
The program and participants 
The Austin Technology Incubator’s Student Entrepreneur Acceleration and Launch (ATI SEAL) 
program is a nine-week summer program designed to help student firms identify and address 
threats to their new ventures. In SEAL, firms examine market interest, technology fit and 
function, and ultimately the ability to create and support a differentiated value proposition that 
can support successful commercialization. SEAL provides a mentor-driven approach to assist 
student-led enterprises. In SEAL, firms 
1. Identify key challenges that stand between their vision and market success; 
2. Test business and technology claims in the marketplace; 
3. Define their value propositions; and  
4. Communicate their decision to launch (“Go”), stop development (“No go”), or change 
strategy (“Pivot”).  
 
SEAL provides both structured and unstructured opportunities for firms to develop, including the 
following: 
Kickoff pitches: At the beginning of SEAL, firms deliver their existing, 12-minute pre-SEAL 
pitches. 
Lunch and learns: Five 2.5-hour catered events in which guest speakers from the Austin 
technology community discussed entrepreneurship-related topics. 
Workshops: Three 2-hour workshops in which guest speakers from the Austin technology 
community assisted with specific firm development needs. 
 8 
Mentorship: Unstructured meetings with 2-5 assigned mentors familiar with the sector in which 
each firm intends to compete (e.g., healthcare, Internet, water technology, transportation).  
Decision Day pitches: At the end of SEAL, firms deliver their final, 5-minute pitches, including 
their decision about whether to launch, stop development, or pivot. 
The SEAL program has been in operation since 2009. In 2017, SEAL had 17 firms. After their 
kickoff pitches, we received mentors’ rankings and individual feedback for firms in the form of 
Business Pitch Presentation Feedback Forms (BPPFFs). In these forms, up to 18 mentors 
individually rated each firm on a 1-5 scale for multiple criteria, including “Investment Potential: 
The business represents a real investment opportunity.” This criterion functioned as an overall 
summary of the mentor’s impressions: it represented a judgment based on all of the previous 
criteria.  
To select our sample for this study, we took the average of the mentors’ scores for Investment 
Potential for each of the 17 firms. We then sorted the firms based on their average Investment 
Potential scores and selected every other firm, for a total of 8 firms (47%) in our sample. We 
then approached firms. If a firm said no to interviews, we went to an adjacent firm on the ranked 
list (i.e., ranked either the next higher or the next lower). Two firms said no, and a third did not 
respond. Table 3 shows the participating firms. 
 
This strategy yielded a sample with a range of readiness; a range of industries; firms approaching 
different markets; and firms with different categories of innovations (healthcare, information 
technology, transportation, water technology). 
 
Table 3. Teams participating in the study (ordered by Investment Potential score).  
 
Fir
m 
ID 
Investme
nt 
Potential 
score (out 
of 5) 
Business type Short description Degree being 
earned (or 
recently 
earned) by 
lead innovator 
I1 2.66 Information 
Technology  
A voice recognition platform for 
improving the hotel experience.  
Bachelor’s 
H1 3.07 Healthcare A simplified, mobile-first electronic 
medical records system targeted to 
developing markets. 
MD 
W1 3.09 Water 
Technology 
Molecular solutions for detecting and 
mitigating invasive species in lakes. 
Ph.D. 
I2 3.13 Information 
Technology  
A personal relationship manager app. Bachelor’s 
W2 3.5 Water 
Technology 
A device for reducing water waste 
during shower warm-up. The device 
would be marketed to hotels and would 
Bachelor’s 
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also offer water analytics. 
T1 3.64 Transportation Practical levitation technology. Master’s 
I3 3.77 Information 
Technology  
A distributed market for renting 
personal parking spaces during events; 
Airbnb for parking spaces. 
Bachelor’s 
H2 4.21 Healthcare An instrument allowing scientists and 
technicians to accurately identify the 
proteome (the complete protein 
composition) of their samples. 
Ph.D. 
 
Data collection 
Data collection involved the following methods for answering the research questions: 
Artifacts 
Pitch decks. We collected initial and final pitch decks for each firm’s pitch as well as near-final 
decks from two firms that chose to provide them. 
Surveys 
Business Pitch Presentation Feedback Form (BPPFFs). SEAL surveyed program mentors for 
their evaluations after each kickoff pitch. These surveys were forms with Likert scales; mentors 
circled the appropriate choice on the Likert scale for each characteristic of the pitch and 
optionally annotated the forms. The research team collected 238 responses, of which 108 
responded to the firms in our sample. Researchers keyed the results into a spreadsheet, then 
moved the data into a SQL database. 
Observations 
Videorecorded pitches. For all firms, SEAL videorecorded 15-minute pitches at kickoff (at the 
beginning of the program) and 5-minute pitches on Demo Day (at the end of the program).  
Structured training. SEAL provided two types of structured training during the program: five 
2.5-hour “Lunch and Learns” and three 2-hour workshops. These training sessions were attended 
by the first author, who took observational notes, and were videorecorded.  
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Interviews 
Semistructured initial interviews with selected 2017 SEAL program firm leads. During the 
first two weeks of the program, the first author conducted initial interviews with representatives 
of each selected firm, focusing on the firm’s current pitch and value proposition. Interviews took 
9-26 minutes. (See Table 4.) 
Semistructured final interviews with selected 2017 SEAL program firm leads. During the 
last week before Decision Day, the first author conducted final interviews with representatives of 
each selected firm, focusing on how the firm evolved the pitch and value proposition over time. 
Interviews took 9-25 minutes. (See Table 4.) 
Semistructured interviews with selected 2017 SEAL program mentors. After interviewing 
firm leads, the first author conducted interviews with three mentors who mentored those firms. 
Interviews focused on how each firm evolved the pitch and value proposition over time. 
Interviews took 15-21 minutes. (See Table 4.) 
 
Table 4. Interviews with firms, firm pitches, interviews with mentors. (Length in minutes) 
Firm 
ID 
Initial 
intervie
w 
Final 
intervie
w 
 Mento
r ID 
Firms 
mentored 
Final 
interview 
I1 26:52 25:01  13 H1, I2, I3 14:55 
I2 17:11 14:06  20 H2, I1, I3, T1 21:09 
I3 13:30 15:21  26 W1, W2 17:43 
H1 13:18 10:31     
H2 20:20 20:41     
T1 9:34 9:23     
W1 19:02 14:50     
W2 20:46 24:22     
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Data reduction 
As noted, we selected eight of the 17 participating firms to examine (Table 3), representing a mix 
of investment potential as assessed by mentors. We reduced data further by coding data and 
investigating specific themes (below).  
Data analysis  
We transcribed all interviews, then coded and triangulated the data. 
Coding 
We limited coding to three datasets: (a) initial interviews with firms, (b) final interviews with 
firms, and (c) interviews with mentors. (We chose not to code videorecorded pitches because our 
review of the videos suggested that the oral pitches were redundant with the interviews and pitch 
decks.) Coding was non-exclusive. Authors 2 and 3 coded entries under Author 1’s direction, 
initially using descriptive starter codes (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana 2014) based on central 
concerns implied within our theoretical frame, such as the identified problem and solution; value 
proposition development; and the degree to which a value proposition had been described or 
proposed. Once starter codes were applied, Authors 2 and 3 performed open coding (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008) to inductively identify recurrent themes related to problematization, 
interessement, and value proposition statements and transformations. Appendix A shows selected 
codes.  
Once we identified themes in codes, we used other datasets to confirm and illustrate them, 
examining how firms transformed their value propositions between pitch decks.  
Triangulating 
We also triangulated datasets, comparing interview statements with each other and with other 
data. Specifically, we triangulated along these lines: 
The initial value proposition. We compared firms’ initial interview statements about their value 
propositions with their initial (kickoff) pitch decks. 
The initial understanding of their challenges. We compared firms’ initial interview statements 
about their challenges with the kickoff mentor forms. 
Changes in the value proposition. We compared firms’ initial and final interview statements 
about their value propositions; we compared their initial (kickoff) and final (Decision Day) pitch 
decks; we compared the results with their mentors’ interviews. 
Outcome. We compared the firms’ changes in their value proposition to their Decision Day 
outcome (Go, No Go, or Pivot) and rationale. 
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Findings and Analysis 
Firms in this sample worked in four broad domains: water technology, information technology, 
health sciences, and transportation (Table 3). As is often the case in entrepreneurship education 
programs, firms varied widely in their innovations and backgrounds. Specifically, they ranged in 
their basic relationships with their technologies. On one end of the continuum, firms began with 
an existing, relatively stable technology, then sought problems that the technology could solve 
(“technology-first” firms, which observe trends). On the other end, firms started by identifying a 
specific problem, then sought to develop a technology to solve it (“problem-first” firms, which 
find gaps).  
The two technology-first firms (T1, H2) were built on technologies developed by advanced 
degree holders within university research. Thus these technologies were relatively stable, but the 
firms were new to considering business applications and problems. For instance, T1’s founder 
had developed his technology for his Master’s thesis in engineering, and decided to develop a 
business around it just a week before SEAL began. Since these firms tended to be formed around 
technology developed in long-term funded research programs, their main challenge was to find a 
problem that could be solved by the existing technology, in which they had invested considerable 
energy, time, and resources. These technologies were grounded in deep technical expertise: few 
had the expertise to develop such technologies.  
Three of the four problem-first firms (I1, I2, I3) were all built by undergraduates; the fourth, H1, 
was founded by an MD. These firms tended to identify a problem first, then use readily available 
technology to address the problem through an emergent innovation. For instance, I1 thought of 
the business idea (a voice recognition platform for improving the hotel experience) six months 
before SEAL and began developing software to implement that vision. For these firms, the main 
challenge was to quickly develop technology that could address the problem; they had little 
investment in the technology itself, which could be conceivably developed by anyone with the 
requisite app development skills. Notably, all of these firms developed software products, which 
were comparatively easy to develop and iterate in comparison to the solutions of the technology-
first firms. Since the technologies built by the problem-first firms were easy to iterate, the firms 
themselves could pivot more easily.  
Somewhere in the middle were the two water technology firms, including W1 and W2. Both 
applied familiar, malleable technology to an unfamiliar domain. For instance, the founder of W1, 
a Ph.D.-holding biologist specializing in cancer research, had heard about the problem of 
invasive species in Texas lakes and applied ideas from “early diagnostics for early-stage 
cancers” to the new domain. For these two water tech firms, the challenge was to synchronize a 
malleable technology with a problem in an unfamiliar domain. 
In the analysis below, we follow these firms through the SEAL process: their pre-SEAL state, 
their kickoff pitches, their progress through the SEAL program, and their Demo Day pitches 
(Figure 1).  
 13 
 
Figure 1. SEAL components. 
 
Pre-SEAL 
Firms applied for SEAL based on an innovation, and (as we’ll see below) they had to present a 
pitch deck on their first day. Thus every firm had done considerable preparatory work before 
SEAL began. W1’s founder, for instance, discussed how he had first discovered the problem of 
invasive species in lakes:  
I had the original idea for it about four years ago... . It was actually over Christmas, and 
my dad and my best friend were both kvetching about zebra mussels to some extent or 
another, but from different angles. I was the biologist in the room and I didn't know what 
a zebra mussel was, which was very unfortunate. (W1 interview 1) 
 
He began researching the problem and realized that it could be solved by applying solutions that 
had been developed in his own line of work: “Early diagnostics for early-stage cancers. The idea, 
of course, being prevention is cure. That was something that could be plugged and played into a 
early detection and monitoring system at a much lower cost and drive revenue.” About a year 
before SEAL, he launched the company and “Since then we've been trying to ramp up and get 
the word out and all that.” During that time, he joined a local bioscience incubator—a common 
move for young firms, since an incubator can provide mentoring, coaching, networking, and 
access to capital (Soetanto & Jack 2016, p.25). Mentoring came in the form of a venture 
capitalist (VC), who advised W1 to develop a pitch deck that focused on the problem, solution, 
and firm (W1 interview 1). 
At this point, W1 had represented the problem as primarily early detection and prevention: “early 
detection prevention costs about one-tenth of the cost of annual maintenance. If you can prevent, 
for even a year, you've saved 90 percent of your money for that year.” Eradication, although 
possible, would involve far more expense. The market was vague, starting with “my dad and my 
best friend” and expanding to “fisheries and recreation,” lake authorities, and “US Fish and 
Wildlife and Bureau of Reclamation and others.”  
As a student entrepreneurship program, SEAL might be expected to attract innovators with 
roughly the same level of experience, yet the innovators varied in entrepreneurship experience.  
Like W1, all of the interviewees had prior entrepreneurship education and/or mentorship 
experience: they either received entrepreneurship training, worked with mentors, or worked in an 
accelerator or incubator (see Table 5). But this experience varied widely. For instance, I3 studied 
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entrepreneurial management in college and was mentored by an investment group made up of 
alumni of that college. I1, I2, and T1 all participated in the same accelerator at their university. 
W1 was in a bioscience incubator attached to a community college, while W2 had “16 
advisors/mentors” and was simultaneously participating in “four different incubators” (including 
SEAL). One interviewee had taken business classes and was simultaneously working with 
another summer accelerator program at another university (H1). One firm (H2) had gone through 
the SEAL program two years earlier; at that earlier stage, the firm had decided to defer 
developing the business until they had developed their technology further. Between their two 
times in the SEAL program, they participated in an NSF I-Corps program and in two 
competitions.  
Kickoff 
During the kickoff event, each firm had 12 minutes to present their initial pitch. These pitches 
served as a baseline for SEAL mentors, experienced entrepreneurs in different industries. These 
mentors listened to each pitch, engaged in a short question-and-answer (Q&A) period, then rated 
each pitch. Later, mentors would be paired with appropriate firms throughout the rest of the 
program.  
W1 presented last (17th) at the kickoff event. Guided by an advisor from a venture capital firm, 
W1’s deck had two slides describing the problem of these two invasive species, then four slides 
detailing the qualifications of the three firm members, then three slides on their solutions. 
“Solutions: Early Detection” emphasized novelty, flexibility, and cost; “Solutions: Equipment” 
emphasized automation and data quality; and “Solutions: Eradication” described a proposed 
immunotoxin eradication solution that could be “Bioengineered to ONLY impact the target 
species” while being “Highly efficient and economical.”  
During the Q&A, one mentor asked: What’s the actual technology? W1 explained that two were 
involved. For early detection and monitoring, W1 offered an automated early detection platform 
based on a proprietary algorithm. For eradication, W1 proposed using a chimeric protein. In 
response to another mentor, W1 asserted that zebra and quahog mussels were just the “low 
hanging fruit,” and W1 could apply the same strategy to addressing other invasive species such 
as Asian carp and invasive plants. That is, W1 planned to start in a beachhead market, then 
expand to adjacent markets (Moore 1991). 
As we saw at the beginning of the article, mentors rated W1’s investment potential as relatively 
low (3.5 of 5). Although they agreed that W1 had identified an important problem, 7 of the 11 
agreed that W1 needed to work on market validation or market segment/size. Although W1 had 
identified a problem, it had not identified a market: specific actors (such as lake authorities or 
specific state agencies) who would pay to solve it. Indeed, W1’s problem slides had only 
mentioned vague actors, and only in the context of displaying news headlines: “Montana”; 
“Oregon legislators”; “Officials”; “State Agencies.” Two weeks after the kickoff pitch, W1’s 
founder told us that “It's an immediate problem that needs to be solved.” Here, the italicized 
words represent interessement opportunities for various markets: 
[Invasive mollusks] grow in such density on top of each other, that they can clog pipes, 
break pipes...anything you put in the water ends up getting covered in these things to the 
point where they are unusable. Buoys, shipping systems, water treatment facilities, water 
transport facilities. Power plants that use the lake as a cooling source and on from there. 
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All have to essentially shut down to treat whenever they have to treat. The screens and 
the other things that they put up to try and prevent them doing critical damage to the 
entire system are expensive and have to be replaced constantly. (W1 first interview) 
 
Yet, even two weeks after the kickoff pitch, these market actors were still vaguely defined. For 
whom was this problem a problem, and could they provide the revenue stream necessary to 
sustain a business around this technology? Not surprisingly, W1 received low marks for target 
market (3), market size (2.9), understanding of competitors (2.4), sales analysis (1.4), and 
revenue model (1.3). W1’s founder reviewed this feedback and said that “a lot of it was spot 
on… I had cut all of that out of the pitch deck. On [his VC mentor’s] advice, but whatever, it was 
my call.”  
This kickoff deck summarized the value proposition in the three Solutions slides: the novelty, 
flexibility, and low cost of detection, the automation and data quality of monitoring, and the 
specificity and low cost of eradication. When we asked W1 to orally summarize the initial value 
proposition, he emphasized the low costs of early detection and the severity of this “immediate 
problem that needs to be solved.” Importantly, this early attempt at a value proposition provided 
a vague problem and no representation of the market.  
Others had difficulty as well. For instance, T1, whose idea for a business was only a week old at 
kickoff, got high marks for his technology and problem, but low marks for market, competitors, 
revenue model, and expenses: as one mentor said, “this is a tech[nology] right now” without a 
defined market or application. T1 did not even express a value proposition in its deck. 
Nevertheless, on the strength of its levitation technology, T1 scored higher in investment 
potential than W1. In contrast, I1, whose business idea was three months old, received the lowest 
investment potential score in our sample due to low marks on problem, market, and competitors, 
among others. One mentor bluntly asked: “what problem are you solving? for hotels? for hotel 
patrons? for hardware manu[facturers]?”  
At the kickoff stage, then, W1 and the other firms generally struggled to provide an adequate 
value proposition that represented a problem-market relationship well enough to serve as the 
foundation for a business.  
SEAL 
After the kickoff pitches, W1 and the other firms began SEAL activities (Figure 1). These 
activities included structured programming: three 2-hour workshops and five 2.5-hour “Lunch 
and Learns” in which experienced local entrepreneurs covered specific aspects of 
entrepreneurship. They also included unstructured interactions with mentors and with other firms 
in the provided coworking space, as well as an optional video course. Through mentors, firms 
could also pursue customer discovery and validation (i.e., pitching the innovation to potential 
customers to gain their feedback) and sales. That is, these activities provided opportunities for 
firms to further articulate problem and market and to iterate their value propositions. 
The second Lunch and Learn, on Market Sizing and Validation, was pivotal for W1. In this 
session, the SEAL director spoke briefly before the guest speaker, and he used an analogy that 
has been used in entrepreneurship since at least the 1970s: A vitamin is good for long-term well 
being, but an aspirin relieves immediate pain. The SEAL director emphasized that although 
buyers might know they needed a vitamin, they were more likely to buy an aspirin: “If you ever 
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had a migraine, you’d pay about anything to get it solved.” W1 realized that its prospective 
customers might know that they should take the preventative measures of early detection and 
monitoring, measures that could save them 90% of their potential expenses. But they would 
likely wait to spend money until they felt the pain of the unsolved problem—that is, until they 
had to eradicate an infestation. In a later conversation, the SEAL director pointed out to W1 that 
even if he could convince lake authorities to spend proactively, other stakeholders in their 
organizations may not allow it until they faced an actual, verified problem (an infestation). This 
is in fact how W1’s potential customers operated. 
Based on this discussion, by the end of SEAL, W1 orally described its revised value proposition 
as “eradication” of the invasive species. “It's not just early detection and monitoring. It’s, ‘This is 
how we can actually solve your problems.’ That's a lot more persuasive than the early detection 
modeling that we were doing previously.” W1 had begun “working on this pitch for Texas Water 
Development Board,” a specific agency, and had also been involved in conversations with a local 
lake authority.  
When W1 decided to treat the innovation as an “aspirin” rather than a “vitamin,” the changes 
were material: W1 shifted its technology development efforts, identified specific decision-
makers (audiences), began thinking about how to support those decision-makers’ internal 
arguments with their stakeholders, and changed its business plan. W1 also started closely 
monitoring rainfall in the region, since lake levels would affect how quickly decision-makers 
would need to make decisions. W1 was able to define significant human and nonhuman actors in 
relation to a mutually interdefined problem and to invite them to define each other in turn. The 
value proposition was developed to represent this stabilized relationship. 
Like W1, many of the other firms found the Market Sizing and Validation Lunch and Learn to be 
pivotal. For instance, after this Lunch and Learn, I1 began focusing on customer discovery, 
which became “the most valuable part of the summer”:  
because I actually ... stood outside and actually talk[ed] to people and I was like, “What 
do you think about this? Would you stay in a hotel that had this? Would you use this? Do 
you like this?” ... I ran a couple of focus groups—a group of people that were just the 
public— and then I talked to some people on the Internet running a survey through social 
media. I also talked to hotel managers. I reached out and got a pretty low response rate 
from the managers but very important information. I spent my time doing customer 
discovery outside of the structured portion of the SEAL program. (I1 interview 2) 
 
One mentor praised I1 for this shift: “[I1] is a prototypical entrepreneur. ... His journey through 
SEAL has been essentially finding out that his approach was wrong. Like he's got the wrong 
market to deploy his technology and he's been real good about seeing that as an opportunity as 
opposed to a failure. ... that's where I think you separate entrepreneurs from inventors” (M2). 
 
T1 similarly found the structured and unstructured programming to be useful: 
It has helped us, especially through the mentors, to see more of what an investor would 
want to see as opposed to what an engineer would want to see. When I started this, I was 
purely focused on the technology and the physics behind it, [technology] validation and 
all those things. All the financials, business, value prop, all that was [secondary]. That 
should be put as a first priority, especially when you're asking for money. (T1 interview 
2) 
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As they articulated their problems and markets differently, the firms began to iterate their value 
propositions. Although all firms iterated their value propositions, they iterated in different ways, 
including changing the argument, application, and financial model (see Table 2). To understand 
these iterations, below, we group the firms based by their orientations to their technologies, then 
discuss their iterations in detail. Here, we draw on our interviews with firms near the end of 
SEAL, shortly before Demo Day. 
Technology-first firms 
As noted earlier, the two technology-first firms (T1, H2) were built around a technology that 
they had developed over a long period of time, leveraging their specific technical expertise, in 
academic environments. Thus we were not surprised to find that these two firms did not iterate 
the design of their technologies.  
T1 iterated its value proposition insofar as they had not offered a specific value proposition in 
their initial deck; in the interview, they proposed building their hover technology into both 
consumer and industrial products, identifying advantages for each application. Although T1 
characterized this iteration as a change in financial model, we coded it as a change in 
application. However, this iteration did not target specific problems or markets. 
H2 iterated both its argument and its application. Its plan was to offer services to pharmaceutical 
companies in the short term, giving the firm the time and investment to develop and sell products 
(instruments, consumables) in the long term. Yet, as mentor M2 noted, their value proposition 
did not identify specific market pain that was acute enough to motivate customers to immediately 
pay for a solution: 
[H2 is] a little bit ahead of the market. Two to five years, maybe 10 years ahead of the 
market in terms of their ambition and what their tech can do. It's a very common thing 
and being too early is the same thing as being wrong as far as an investor's concerned. ... 
They needed to hone in on, “Here’s the market where we can get into immediately, prove 
our technology. It’s decent enough sized that we can, with a modest investment, grow to 
a good size to where we're ready to raise significant, probably eight to nine figures of 
capital.” 
 
M2 added that to do this, H2 would need new “soft” (rhetorical) skills, and “that’s a hard ask of 
someone to develop a bunch of soft skills when they are used to ‘I’m rewarded for being the best 
at whatever in my field.’” 
Problem-first firms 
Surprisingly, the problem-first firms also did not iterate their products in terms of design. That is, 
although they may have made minor interface changes such as adding a screen or changing 
icons, their overall software designs did not change significantly. Rather, they changed 
arguments, applications, and financial models in their attempts to identify and relieve market 
pain. 
I1, I3, and H1 all iterated their arguments. For instance, I1 had initially offered “data analysis” to 
hotels, but now expressed why hotels might need such a data analysis: “insight and truly 
providing a good experience for their customers, but insight into what those customers want.” I3 
had initially offered a list of features for his parking space marketplace; by the end of SEAL, he 
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summarized his service as “we eliminate ... the headache that goes along with parking” for 
people attempting to attend events. Finally, H1’s initial value proposition described features 
rather than benefits: “Standardization of field data,” “Integrated interfaces to reporting systems,” 
and a “Software as a Service (SaaS) solutions model.” Its final value proposition emphasized 
true benefits in relieving pain: as “a simplified EMR built for providers by providers” (a phrase 
that would also show up verbatim in H1’s Demo Day deck).  
I1 and I2 also iterated their application. For instance, I1 had initially tried to offer value to 
travelers; by the end of SEAL, I1 realized that he had to offer value specifically to the hotels, 
which would be his actual customers. Similarly, I3’s initial value proposition listed services for 
“everyone”; its final value proposition narrowed the problem, focusing on non-sales executives 
who were nevertheless involved in the sales process, “helping you follow up and follow through 
with individuals. ... [the software tells] you who you need to reach out to, when to reach out to 
them, and even what to say. The second part is giving you that holistic overview of your 
network.” By narrowing the application from “everyone else” to people in startups and other 
small businesses—who might not be salespeople but who feel the pain of being involved in 
ongoing sales efforts—I2 was able to make a more concrete argument for value. 
Finally, I3 iterated the value proposition in terms of financial model. I3’s original value 
proposition attempted to articulate value for both sides of a two-sided market (a market in which 
both the buyer and seller pay for a service; see Osterwalder et al. 2010). During the Market 
Sizing and Validation lunch-and-learn, I3 was advised that such markets were hard to build. This 
insight led I3 to shift its business model, selecting just one buyer and focusing on how to address 
a defined problem for that buyer.  
Water technology firms 
As mentioned, the two water technology firms were neither technology-first nor problem-first. 
These firms both iterated their value propositions as well. 
W1, as we saw earlier, had begun by emphasizing the “vitamin” of early detection and 
prevention. After attending a workshop, W1 iterated its value proposition by emphasizing the 
“aspirin” of eradication. Detection and prevention were still services, but as W1 told us, they 
were “much more connected, like a vertical play. It makes a hell of a lot more sense than it did 
before.” This new focus had led W1 to iterate based on argument (claiming a solution for 
infested lakes rather than threatened lakes), application (eradication-first, not detection- and 
prevention-first), and financial model (eradication meant that authorities could draw on different 
funds). 
W2, on the other hand, had already iterated considerably before entering SEAL—in fact, the 
founder told us that the device had originally been developed for entirely different reasons, then 
had been redesigned with substantial feedback from potential customers. Perhaps for that reason, 
W2’s value proposition had not changed dramatically during its participation in SEAL. But W2 
had been able to iterate its financial model. As the founder told us during his second interview, 
they had identified two different hotel segments: “One is economy hotel segment and the other is 
there’s a green hotel segment.” The green hotel segment was a luxury segment, whose customers 
might be interested in the innovation for personal use. Thus W2 iterated the financial model to 
bring more financial value to those stakeholders: “Any consumer devices we sell through their 
hotel, they get a cut.”  
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Notably, none of the firms chose to iterate their value propositions in terms of design. Even for a 
problem-first firm developing software, eight weeks is perhaps too short a time to iterate design 
productively. In any case, SEAL did not include workshops on co-iterating design with users 
(such as through Design Thinking).   
Demo Day 
On Demo Day, each firm presented a brief version of its pitch deck. These pitch decks served a 
dual purpose: They encapsulated each firm’s pitch, but they also explained what the firms had 
learned during SEAL and whether they had chosen to “Go” (launch a business based on the 
innovation) or “No Go” (decide not to launch). SEAL personnel emphasized that a “No Go” was 
just as important as a go, yet only one firm (outside our sample) chose an unambiguous “No 
Go.” Other firms chose “Slow Go” (I1), “Phased Go” (H2), “Pivot/Go” (another firm outside our 
sample), or “Go” (all other firms). 
Overall, firms’ slides demonstrated newly formulated value propositions with more specific 
problems and markets. These value propositions often also reflected more specific 
implementations of technology to unite the problem and market. For instance, following its 
“aspirin” strategy, W1 first included a slide called “Partners” to demonstrate some of the many 
specific agencies that had already been interested: US Fish and Wildlife Service, Colorado Parks 
& Wildlife, Texas Parks & Wildlife, and eight more. W1 then included this slide to emphasize its 
main value proposition of targeted eradication (Table 5). 
 
Table 5. Comparison of initial and final value propositions for I1, T1, and W1. 
Fir
m 
Written value proposition 
from kickoff deck 
Spoken value proposition 
(interview 1) 
Written value proposition 
from Demo Day deck 
Spoken value proposition 
(interview 2) Iterations 
I1 “For travelers: 
voice assistant “remote 
control” for your hotel room” 
(Slide 3) 
 
“For hotels: 
Communication 
In-room Revenue 
Data mining, Analytics” 
(Slide 4) 
“My value proposition is to 
hotel saying, "You pay for 
this software service and you 
let people interact with this 
for free. What we’re charging 
you for is the analysis of how 
people interact." The behavior 
interaction, providing you 
reports, visualization of that 
data, insight that we're pulling 
from that data. … the value 
proposition is in we're 
providing insight on data 
analysis.” 
"In-room voice assistants will 
create a better customer 
experience for travelers and 
increase hotel’s daily 
RevPAR (revenue per 
available room)" (slide 2) 
"a way to communicate and 
customize the experience.... 
insight and truly providing a 
good experience for their 
customers, but insight into 
what those customers want." 
ARGUMEN
T 
APPLICAT
ION 
T1 (No value proposition 
statement; the deck identifies 
potential markets and 
applications.) 
“It would depend on the 
market we approach. For 
instance, we're in talks with 
Disney. Last week we got a 
meeting with one of them. 
We're waiting to hear back. 
Our value proposition to them 
would be that wow factor, 
especially to help with the 
emerging experience in 
Disney.” 
"A patent-pending air 
levitation design 
 
Maglev heights at a fraction 
of the cost 
 
30% cheaper build minus 
SURFACE COST! 
 
Designed to levitate a train 
and make MagLev 
Irrelevant!" (slide 4) 
"Consumer, we have a 
technology that is unlike 
anything else on the market. 
We don't need a special 
surface to hover, unlike 
magnets. We can hover more 
than 10,000 times higher than 
any other commercial air 
bearings. Then price point, 
there's not a single 
hoverboard. We are half as 
cheap as the competition, 
APPLICAT
ION 
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which is magnetic. That's 
what we propose on the 
consumer. Then the industrial 
sector, it would be more of a 
compliment to old-school 
pallets and just movement of 
heavy equipment." 
W1 “Solutions: Early Detection”; 
emphasizes novelty, 
flexibility, cost (Slide 8) 
 
“Solutions: Equipment”; 
emphasizes automation, data 
quality (Slide 9) 
 
“Solutions: Eradication”; 
emphasizes specificity and 
low cost (Slide 10) 
“… Early detection 
prevention costs about one-
tenth of the cost of annual 
maintenance. ...You save 90 
percent of your money each 
year you do an early detection 
and monitoring as opposed to 
doing treatment. The second 
stage of that is this is a 
massive market. There's about 
two billion dollars spent 
annually on invasive species. 
Mitigation, about half of that 
is spent of zebra and quahog 
mussels. They are also 
spreading rapidly. It's an 
immediate problem that needs 
to be solved.” 
"[W1] Eradication = Specific, 
Efficient, Scalable 
 
Species Specific 
 
Proven Technology in 
Oncology and Human Health 
Applications 
 
Large Scale Production at 
Low Cost" (slide 9) 
"one, detect [invasive species] 
earlier so that you can 
mitigate the problem or 
eradicate the problem 
immediately. Two, if an issue 
has been detected, there are 
methodologies that have been 
successful at early-stage or 
low biodiversity stage. They 
can be eradicated. ... we're 
developing a chimeric protein 
that's very specific to only 
killing zebra mussels and 
nothing else in the 
environment. ... we're ... 
developing an automated 
sampler that can be installed 
at problem points and sample 
the water remotely. You can 
save time and money. You 
don't have to send out people 
constantly to go surveying." 
ARGUMEN
T 
APPLICAT
ION 
FINANCIA
L 
 
Whereas T1 had not even identified a value proposition or specific market, problem, or 
product—in the Kickoff deck, its Demo Day deck included both: it proposed to enter a specific 
market, the market for high-end consumer products, by developing a hoverboard. Once that 
product had been marketed, it proposed, it would enter a second market (for industrial pallets). 
The slide deck included specific benefits and competitive advantages for the identified market—
a significant advance in the argument. 
I1’s value proposition reflected I1’s journey by focusing on the customer (hotels): “In-room 
voice assistants will create a better customer experience for travelers and increase hotel’s daily 
RevPAR (revenue per available room)” (slide 2). Not only does this value proposition focus on a 
more specific problem (revenue per available room) and market (hotels), it demonstrates the 
results of I1’s customer discovery by naming the appropriate measure that hotels might use. 
The other firms also iterated their value propositions in their Demo Day decks. In particular, I2 
and I3 each took the tack of presenting a customer’s quote as the value proposition—essentially 
turning their customers into spokespeople. Overall, these value propositions, like W1’s, 
represented stable problem-market relationships that could serve as proposed foundations for 
building businesses. Unfortunately, SEAL did not ask mentors to assess Demo Day pitches, so 
we cannot provide mentors’ assessments of whether these pitches improved. 
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Post-SEAL 
During their time in SEAL, all firms in our sample transformed their value propositions along 
three of the four transformation paths: argument, application, and financial model. As they did, 
they tended to represent the problem and market more specifically, and in some cases, described 
a more specific technology to address the problem-market relationship.  
For W1 in particular, the iterated value proposition also guided research and development 
efforts, marketing, and partnerships. We reached out to W1 eight months after Demo Day, and 
the founder reported lasting effects from their value proposition iteration, specifically from the 
“aspirin” metaphor. W1 had completed a prototype for automatically sampling lakes for invasive 
species; completed final validation for their detection technology; and was moving forward with 
a partner on designing a biopesticide for eradication. The “aspirin” metaphor was now a primary 
driver in W1’s marketing as well as its R&D efforts. In sum, the problematization and 
interessement achieved in the SEAL program, and represented in W1’s final value proposition, 
had proven stable enough to support the enrollment and mobilization of allies.  
Meanwhile, the founder of I1 spent some months attempting to bootstrap his innovation before 
deciding to give up the idea. He reported that he realized his real interest is in software 
development, and once he decided to stop pursuing the business, he felt less stressful and more 
rewarded. T1 continues to work out of a university accelerator. True to its technology-first 
orientation, T1 has attracted some investment based on the working prototypes it is continuing to 
develop and is working on customer discovery to identify early adopters.  
Implications 
In this paper, we have examined a specific case: how student entrepreneurs iterated their value 
propositions. Through this qualitative case study, we examined how these entrepreneurs 
developed claims that their technological innovations could help specific people with specific 
problems. In keeping with the sociology of translation, we examined incidents in which these 
firms identified problems (problematization) and the markets or market representatives that faced 
these problems (interessement), and we identified specific pathways that the firms followed to 
iterate their value proposition claims. These value propositions would ideally be stable enough to 
support other entrepreneurial decisions; in some cases, they appear to be.  
Callon's sociology of translation has been used in writing studies to better understand the 
distributed, material nature of arguments (e.g., McNely 2009; Potts 2009; Read & Swarts 2015; 
Spinuzzi 2010; Spinuzzi et al. 2016; Swarts 2010, 2011, 2016), as has the approach in which it 
has been based, actor-network theory (e.g., Graham 2015; Lynch & Rivers 2015; Teston 2017). 
It has also been used more broadly in studies of science and technology (Latour 1996, 2006), 
including entrepreneurship (Akrich, Callon, & Latour 2002a, b). And it is usually examined as a 
unified arc of change with four moments. In applying translation to entrepreneurship, however, 
we have found it useful to separate the four moments of translation, examining the first two 
moments more closely and directly. We have demonstrated how, in technology entrepreneurship, 
the first two moments can be—and are frequently expected to be—relatively stabilized in a 
claim, the value proposition. This claim is then presented in a pitch, which can serve as a trial 
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before the enrollment and mobilization required to complete translation and cement a lasting 
alliance. Future work in writing studies could explore whether specific genres, such as the pitch 
deck, perform similar stabilization work in emergent cross-disciplinary arguments.  
For SEAL, an entrepreneurship education program, the pitch is the end of the story. But in a 
pitch to stakeholders (buyers, investors, partners), the value proposition can be tested and 
sometimes even co-iterated before being accepted or rejected. That is, during the pitch, the firm 
attempts to move to the next stage of translation by enrolling more allies, and those allies submit 
it to trials (Latour 1987) before deciding whether to accept that enrollment. The value 
proposition is relatively stable, but must still be flexible enough to endure this round of co-
iteration.  
Also specific to entrepreneurship, we have argued that entrepreneurs have at least four avenues 
open to them as they consider iterating their value propositions: argument, application, design, 
and financial model. In this case, we have identified examples of three of these avenues and 
demonstrated how they yielded changes not just to the value proposition as a stated claim, but 
also to other material decisions a firm made. 
As writing researchers examine written arguments in such complex cross-disciplinary domains, 
we believe, they will need to develop frameworks that adequately examine mutual persuasion 
with a consensus that emerges over time and across parties. Entrepreneurship, we argue, is a 
good testbed for this development, and the sociology of translation provides a starting point for 
it. 
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Appendix A: Sample codes 
 
Theoretical concept Code Description Code type 
Problematization PROBLEM_STATEMENT Entrepreneur's analysis of customer complaints: 
The "diagnosis" 
Starter 
Interessement ENTITY_CUSTOMER Entrepreneur characterizations of customers 
(market) who face the problem or who could use 
the innovation. 
Open 
 MARKET_PAIN Customer's complaints that a service is not being 
provided: The "symptoms" 
Open 
 MARKET_VALIDATION Entrepreneur characterizes feedback about their 
idea from market representatives 
Open 
Value proposition VP_CORE Statement of the core value proposition Open 
 VP_COCREATION Evidence of developing the value proposition with 
other parties 
Starter 
 VP_GDL Describes the positive characteristics of the 
offering as a good (i.e., Goods-Dominant Logic) 
Starter 
 VP_SDL Proposes the positive effects of the offering as a 
service (i.e., Service-Dominant Logic) 
Starter 
 25 
Value proposition iterations 
(AADF) 
VP_ARG Value proposition: argument is iterated. Open 
 VP_USE Value proposition: application is iterated. Open 
 VP_DESIGN Value proposition: design is iterated. Open 
 VP_FINMODEL Value proposition: financial model is iterated. Open 
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Appendix B: Interview questions 
Interview questions for SEAL 2017 initial firm interview 
● Give me your elevator pitch. What is your innovation? 
● Could you describe your value proposition?  
● Before SEAL, had you ever pitched an innovation before?  
● Where did you get your kickoff deck? How did you prepare for entering SEAL? Did you 
take other entrepreneurship classes or workshops? Watch other pitches? Read about how 
to pitch? 
● How has your SEAL experience been so far?  
Interview questions for SEAL 2017 final firm interview 
● Give me your elevator pitch. What is your innovation? 
● Could you describe your value proposition?  
● Bottom-line your SEAL training for me. What did you do in the SEAL program?  
● What was the most useful aspect of SEAL training? The least useful? 
● We tend to see four types of changes in a value proposition: in the argument (claims and 
evidence); in the proposed use or application; in the technology’s design; and in the 
economic model. Did you change your value proposition along these aspects? For those 
that you did, how did you decide to make these changes? 
● If you could change SEAL in just one way to make it better, what would it be? 
Interview questions for SEAL 2017 retrospective mentor interview 
● How did you come to be a SEAL mentor? How long have you served as a SEAL mentor?  
● Which teams did you mentor this year? 
● As a SEAL mentor, what do you do?  
● Discuss your experience with each team. How did they change?  
● Discuss each team’s changes in their idea, pitch, and value proposition. 
● If you could change SEAL in just one way to make it better, what would it be? 
